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Abstract As a response to the financial crises, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervisions (BCBS) endorsed the Basel III framework in 2010 to increase
the overall loss absorbency of the banking sector. This paper contributes to the
ongoing discussion on higher capital requirements as it analyzes the relation
of higher capital requirements to the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
Based on a theoretical background from corporate finance a linear model is
estimated using year-over-year differences for OLS and fixed-effects estimations.
The sample is constructed using observations for about 680 banks from 22
jurisdictions covering the years 2003 to 2016. The results show a significant,
positive relationship between the capital ratio and the WACC. However, the
effect diminishes after the adoption of Basel III for emerging markets and raises
for advanced economies.
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1 Introduction
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as the international
standard setter for banking regulation endorsed in December 2010 a revised
framework entitled “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient
banks and banking systems” (BCBS, 2011). According to the BCBS the new
standard should raise the loss absorbency capacity of the banking sector in order
to avoid spillover effects to the real economy in future financial crises. The BCBS
is reacting with its reform to the financial and economic crisis beginning in 2007
seeing one of its main reasons in the high leverage of the banking sector.
Support for this implicit argumentation can be found in the economic literature:
Miles et al (2013) as well as Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that higher
capital endowment in the banking sector can reduce the probability of a banking
crisis (and therefore economic downturn). Yet, the results by Jordà et al (2017)
show no empirical evidence on the reduction of the probability of a banking
crisis. However, the authors emphasize that higher capital is still socially
beneficial in terms of overall economic outcome as it reduces the recession
resulting from a banking crisis.
However, representatives of the banking industry emphasize that higher capital
endowment will cause higher cost of capital for the banking sector. As a result,
this will cause higher cost for banking services, in particular, bank loans. Finally,
higher capital ratios for the banking sector would reduce the overall economic
development (American Bankers Association, 2010; Bundesverband Deutscher
Banken, 2010). The Institute for International Finance (2011), an association of
the banking industry, estimated that the changed capital requirements will reduce
real economic growth in the USA by 0.1 percentage points, in the Euro area by
0.4 percentage points and in Japan by 0.3 percentage points. TheMacroeconomic
Assessment Group (2010), one of the expert groups of the BCBS, concludes
that the higher capital requirements will reduce the annual economic growth by
0.03 percentage points in the period of adjustnt. In the steady state the annual
economic growth would increase by 0.03 percentage points.
Several studies analyze the impact of higher capital requirements on the
cost of capital using data from one jurisdiction only. Kashyap et al (2010) and
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Junge and Kugler (2013) use fixed-effect regression to analyze the effect of
capital ratios on equity V according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model by
Sharpe (1964) for a sample of banks from the United States with time-specific
effects, respectively, Switzerland with bank and time specific effects to indicate
indirectly the effects on the overall cost of capital. Based on data for the United
Kingdom, Miles et al (2013) use a period-over-period difference specification
estimating the effects of capital ratios on CAPM equity V using OLS, fixed
effects, and random effect estimations for the indirect analysis of the cost of
capital. On a sample of banks from the European Union, Toader (2015) estimates
the effect of capital ratios on CAPM equity V using OLS, fixed effects, and
random effect estimations. Furthermore, Toader (2015) estimates the impact
of raising capital ratios on the weighted average cost of capital WACC using
simple OLS regression. Using an analytical approach, Firestone et al (2017)
estimate the impact of higher capital ratios on the cost of capital for the banking
sector of the United States using average values.
Mentioning that the post-crisis reforms made by the BCBS will be applied
in all member countries (based on the commitment of the members), we are
contributing to the literature using an international sample from 22 jurisdictions.
As the overall cost of capital is our main variable of interest, we follow the
approach by Toader (2015) using the weighted average cost of capital WACC as
dependent variable but adjusting it for the given interest rate level. Furthermore
to control for spurious regression, we follow Miles et al (2013) using difference
specification (absolute year-over-year differences) and usingOLS aswell as fixed-
effects estimations (including bank and time specific effects). In our research
based on an international sample and including a wider range of observations
after the endorsement of Basel III, we focus on the following two questions:
1. Which dependency exists in general between capital ratios of banks and
the cost of capital?
2. Is there any change to the observed relationship due to the Basel III
framework?
By answering the first question, our results showa significant positive relationship
between capital ratios of banks and cost of capital indicating that higher capital
endowment is in general connected with higher cost of capital. Regarding the
second question, we could identify a lower sensitivity of the cost of capital on the
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capital ratios after the endorsement of Basel III on the global level. This leads
to the implication that the same rise in capital would lead to a lower increase in
the cost of capital compared to the previous regulatory regime and therefore
reduces the overall impact of higher capital requirements. When separating
between advanced economies and emerging markets, advanced economies show
higher sensitivity while emerging markets show lower (and not significant)
sensitivity after the endorsement of Basel III. Our results regarding positive
sensitivity are in line with the results by Firestone et al (2017), Junge and Kugler
(2013), Kashyap et al (2010), and Miles et al (2013) showing a positive relation
between higher capital ratios and cost of capital. But it differs from the results
shown by Toader (2015) who estimates a negative relationship between WACC
and capital ratios (see Section 5).
In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the theoretical background. This
theoretical overview will be used in the empirical analysis to identify possible
factors (tax shield, bankruptcy cost, information asymmetries, deposits as
debt type, implicit state guarantee, dependency from the country of residence)
influencing the relation of capital endowment and cost of capital. Section 3
defines the parameters used when measuring capital requirements and cost
of capital as well as the econometric models used for OLS and fixed effect
estimation. Section 4 will give an overview on the underlying sample. For the
analysis, we use data by Thomson Reuters (now Refinitive) Datastream for the
period from 2003 to 2016 for 22 member countries of the BCBS as well as data
on corporate tax rates by KPMG (2017). The results are presented in Section 5
and show a significant, positive dependency between capital ratios and the cost
of capital. To show the robustness of the relationship, we are using different
specifications and estimation techniques (OLS, fixed effects). Moreover, the
results show a reduction in the sensitivity of cost of capital to capital endowment
after the endorsement of Basel III.
2 Theoretical Framework
When analyzing the relation of capital structure and cost of capital, different
factors have to be considered. In the context of cost of capital and capital
structure the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) is often
mentioned regarding the analysis of capital requirements (see e.g. Firestone
et al, 2017; Junge and Kugler, 2013; Kashyap et al, 2010; Miles et al, 2013;
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Toader, 2015). It assumes a company with indefinite lifespan and it is based on
the assumption of a perfect market where no information asymmetry and no
transaction cost exist. Also, no taxes are considered in its original form. The
theorem concludes that the average cost of capital is independent of the capital
structure and that it is equal to the expected yield of a pure equity financed
company. Furthermore, the expected yield of equity rises with leverage.
In contrast to this theorem based on the perfect market assumption, factors
of an incomplete market have to be considered in the dependency of capital
endowment and cost of capital. Modigliani and Miller (1963) show that the
incorporation of taxes lead to an adjustment of the original Modigliani-Miller
theorem. As interest paid on debt is deducted from taxable income, a company
can increase its economic value with higher indebtedness.
The so called trade-off theory by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) implies a
trade-off between the tax advantage and a disadvantage due to the expected
bankruptcy cost in the case the company fails. As with further leverage, the debt
service and therefore the probability of insolvency rises which will lead to an
increase of the expected value of the bankruptcy cost.
The Modigliani Miller theorem is based on an ex ante view, i.e. without
any adjustments to a higher capital ratio (Miller, 1995). Owing to information
asymmetries, the company’s management would prefer internal financing or
funding on a risk free rate of interest to external financing and would prefer
debt over equity finance (Myers, 1984).
In the model of DeAngelo and Stulz (2015), depositors accept a lower
yield on deposits due to limited market access. For banks therefore, financing
through deposits is more favorable than the use of hedging and risk manage-
ment. This cost advantage over other types of funding results in a funding at
optimal cost using only deposits.
To deviate further from a risk adequate interest rate on debt, implicit state
guarantees can be mentioned. As a reaction to the financial crisis, the BCBS im-
plemented further capital requirements for global systemically important banks
(BCBS, 2013) as well as national relevant banks (BCBS, 2012). One of the rea-
sons for this implementation is expected funding subsidies for large and complex
banks. In such cases, market participants expect governmental support in terms of
financial turmoil as perceived during the financial crises (BCBS, 2013, Para. 3).
Furthermore, resolution regimes were introduced to resolve further this market
distortion (BCBS, 2010). Tölö et al (2015) show that the implementation of
such a resolution regime reduces the funding cost advantage. This can be seen
as empirical evidence for the existence of an implicit state guarantee.
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3 Methodology
The capital requirements of the Basel III framework (BCBS, 2011) consists in
general of two different calculation methods:
1. The risk sensitive capital requirement and
2. the leverage Ratio.
Owing to data availability, we use the approach of risk sensitive capi-
tal requirement which is based on the relation of regulatory equity to




≥ minimum ratio. (1)
The ratio of regulatory equity and RWA (capital ratio) should be at all times
above the minimum ratio. With introduction of the first Basel framework (BCBS,
1998, Para. 28), this is 8% for the overall capital ratio. Since Basel II, the
regulatory equity can be broken down into Tier 1 and Tier 2. The separation
is based on the different cases when the capital instrument is used for loss
absorbency. Tier 1 is used in a going-concern case (business activities will
continue) while Tier 2 is used in the gone-concern case (losses are higher
than Tier 1 and business activities will discontinue; BCBS, 2006, Para. 49 seq.;
BCBS, 2011, Para. 49seq.). With the implementation of Basel III, the minimum
Tier 1 ratio of 4% will be steadily increased to 6% starting in 2013 (BCBS,
2011, Para. 94 (a) and 94 (b)).
Regarding the cost of capital, we define the weighted average cost of capital






A (1 − g). (2)
The weighted average cost of capital WACC is the result of the cost of equity
d and the cost of debt A weighted by the market value of equity ( respectively
the market value of debt  in relation to the company value + . The company
value + is defined as the sum of ( and . As the market value for the varieties
of debt is not available, we use the book value of debt as an approximation.
Furthermore, the cost of debt is adjusted by the corporate tax rate g to include
the tax advantage of interest before dividends.
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For the calculation of the cost of equity, we use the CAPM:
d8,C = A
long
free, 2,C + V8 MRP2 . (3)
The bank (8) and time specific (C) cost of equity d8,C is calculated using the
country (2) and time specific risk free rate of interest A longfree,2,C and the country
specific market risk premium MRP2 as well as the bank specific beta coefficient
V8 . As measure for the risk free rate of interest, we follow the recommendation
of the German Association of Public Accountants (IdW, 2008) to use the yield
of a 10 year sovereign bond for each country. Note: 10 year sovereign yields for
Saudia Arabia could not be obtained. In this case, the fixed leg of an interest
swap with a term of 10 years is used. For the calculation of the market risk
premium the average difference between the historical total returns of stock
index (assuming the reinvestment of dividends) d",C,2 and the yield of the
sovereign bond A longfree, C ,2 is used. The calculation uses data of a period from 1990
to 2016. Due to data availability, years for a specific jurisdiction are considered







d",C,2 − A longfree, C ,2
)
. (4)
For the calculation of V8, the log total returns of the specific bank (d8)
and the log returns of a country specific stock index (d",2) are used on
a calendar year basis:




As interest rates on all individual type of debts are not available, we follow the





The bank and time specific cost of debt A8,C is the relation of the interest expenses
of the period '8,C and the book value of debt of the period 8,C . One could argue
that the interest expenses are the result of contracts made in previous periods.
However, a forward-looking approach such as a calculation using CDS spreads
8 Florian Naunheim, Matthias Gehrke and Jeffrey Heidemann
is not used as we would like to analyze the WACC including any potential
effect of the use of deposits which is assumed to be more independent of any
type of rating than a CDS spread.
Controlling for different levels of interest rates, we use the difference (named
WACC Spread
8,C
) between WACC and the short-term money market (expressed as
risk free short term interest rate A shortfree, C ,2):
WACC Spread
8,C
= WACC8,C − A shortfree, C ,2 . (7)
To control for a spurious regression, we follow the approach by Miles et al
(2013) using first differences (absolute difference to the previous period) to




= U0 + U1 Δ CR8,C +
 ∑
:=1
U:+1 ΔControl:,8,C + n8,C . (8)
Control:,8,C is an institute and time specific set of 1 to  control variables which
is chosen based on the theoretical concepts shown in Section 3. This includes the
ratio of deposit to total liabilities as an indicator for the use of deposits (Deposit
ratio). Following Toader (2015), we use the logarithm of total assets (Size) as
a parameter for including any potential impact of the “too big to fail effect”.
As Modigliani and Miller (1958) assume equivalent earnings for equivalent
companies, we use the return on assets (RoA) as ratio of earnings before interest
and taxes to total assets as indicator for the profitability. Moreover, we use
the corporate tax rate (tax) to control for any change in the national tax code.
All control variables are also considered as absolute difference to the previous
period. As the corporate tax rate is used in the calculation of the WACC, we
test for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test based on a dummy as a
combination of country and time. The test does not reject the null hypothesis
under which both specifications using the difference of the tax rate as well using
the dummy variable result in consistent estimators. For the purpose to check for
robustness, we follow Miles et al (2013) and Toader (2015) using the ordinary
least squares estimation (OLS) (see Equation 8) and a fixed effect estimation
(FE) as given in Equation 9. Contrary to Miles et al (2013) and Toader (2015)
we do not apply a random effects estimation as the used observations are by
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definition not randomly chosen from the population. Additionally, the subject
specific error terms are endogenous as a Hausman-Test shows. Therefore, a
random effects model is not suitable. For the fixed effect estimation the model
is adjusted as follows:
ΔWACC Spread
8,C
= D8 + U1Δ CR8,C +
 ∑
:=1
U:+1ΔControl:,8,C + WC + n8,C . (9)
Table 1: Description of the variables used in the regression models.
Variables Description
ΔWACC Spread Weighted Average cost of capital as spread above the country specific money
market rate as difference to previous period (in percentage points)
Δ CR Tier 1 capital ratio (i.e. Tier 1 capital /RWA) as difference to previous period
(in percentage points)
B2 Dummy variable equals 1 for the years 2004 to 2010, otherwise 0
B3 Dummy variable equals 1 for the years 2011 to 2016, otherwise 0
Δ Size Log total assets as difference to previous period
Δ Deposit ratio Deposit to total liabilities as difference to previous period (in percentage
points)
Δ RoA Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets as difference to
previous period (in percentage points)
Δ Tax rate Country specific tax rate published by KPMG (2017) as difference to previous
period (in percentage points)
The variable D8 is a bank specific effect while WC denotes a time effect. To
analyze our second question, we expand our model using dummy variables to
mark Basel II or Basel III regime. 2 is 1 before the endorsement of the Basel
III framework (years 2004 to 2010) and 0 thereafter (years 2011 to 2016) while
3 is 0 for 2004 to 2010 and 1 for 2011 to 2016:
ΔWACC Spread
8,C




U:+2 Control:,8,C + n8,C .
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Note that the specification for the fixed effect estimation changes to:
ΔWACC Spread
8,C




U:+2Control:,8,C + WC + n8,C .
Table 1 gives an overview over the variables used in the various regression
models.
4 Data
For the empirical analysis, only banks from member countries of the BCBS
(as well as Malaysia holding an observer status) are included to safeguard that
the national regulations are based on the Basel framework. Furthermore, as the
CAPM is used for the calculation of the cost of equity, only listed firms are
included. For the measurement of the corporate tax rate, a country and time
specific rate published by KPMG (2017) is applied. To consider the level of
the risk free rate of interest, the data include money market reference rates
for unsecured 3 months interbank loans for each jurisdiction. The data are
obtained from Thomson Reuters (now Refinitive) Datastream and covers the
years 2003 to 2016. Beside the parameters mentioned to calculate the WACC,
a sufficient amount of data for the regulatory equity (RWA, Tier 1) and for
values of the financial statements (total assets, equity, interest expense, etc.)
has to be obtained to include an observation point. To protect from any quality
issues in the data, we excluded observations with a Tier 1 capital ratio of above
50% as well as observations with negative equity. These restrictions as well as
general data availability result in an unbalanced sample regarding jurisdictions
and calendar years. Tables 2 and 3 show the number of observations as well
as the average values on Tier 1 capital ratios and the different components
for the calculation of WACC Spread.
We used R version 3.4.3 (R Core Team, 2017) to carry out the statistical
analysis employing the packages AER version 1.2.5 (Kleiber and Zeileis, 2008),
car version 2.1.2 (Fox and Weisberg, 2011), data.table version 1.10.0 (Dowle
and Srinivasan, 2017), lmtest version 0.9.34 (Zeileis and Hothorn, 2002), plm
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version 1.6-5 (Croissant and Millo, 2008; Millo, 2017), readxl version 0.1.1
(Wickham, 2016), sandwich version 5.33 (Zeileis, 2004, 2006), and stargazer
version 5.2 (Hlavac, 2015).
Table 2: Data sample: Averages by jurisdictions (2003 to 2016).
Country N CR Cost of capital Afree MRP g
WACC Spread WACC d A short long
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
Australia∗ 54 8.9 −1.0 3.4 10.5 3.6 4.4 4.5 5.9 30.0
Belgium∗ 21 13.4 2.5 4.0 7.7 5.7 1.5 2.5 5 34.0
Canada∗ 108 11.0 −0.4 1.6 6.1 1.8 2.0 3.4 3.7 31.2
China† 137 9.9 −1.3 2.4 10.5 2.1 3.7 2.9 12.6 25.9
France∗ 64 10.4 −0.2 1.4 7.7 1.8 1.6 2.5 4.5 33.5
Germany∗ 33 10.5 −0.3 1.5 8.9 2.0 1.8 2.7 5.8 33.1
Great
Britain∗
63 11.1 −1.1 1.4 9.0 1.3 2.6 3.7 3.9 26.5
India† 133 9.7 −1.8 5.3 19.7 5.8 7.2 7.9 10.2 33.8
Indonesia† 211 14.9 −1.0 7.0 19.9 5.5 8.0 9.1 19.6 27.1
Italy∗ 202 9.7 −0.3 1.3 4.1 1.7 1.7 2.6 1.7 33.7
Japan∗ 793 9.1 0.1 0.5 8.1 0.2 0.3 1.2 9.4 40.1
Luxembourg∗7 8.8 0.9 2.6 3.3 3.6 1.7 2.7 4.6 29.0
Malaysia† 89 11.4 −1.0 2.2 6.1 2.1 3.2 4.0 2.1 25.7
Russia† 20 10.8 −3.8 5.4 14.7 5.4 9.2 8.9 13.8 20.4
Saudi
Arabia†
90 15.5 1.4 3.5 10.8 1.3 2.2 4.1 13.6 20.8
Singapore∗ 29 13.0 0.4 1.8 7.4 1.3 1.4 2.7 4.5 19.0
South
Africa†
54 15.4 −2.2 4.8 13.9 4.4 7.0 8.2 6.5 32.6
South
Korea∗
11 10.7 −0.6 1.8 8.0 2.0 2.4 2.5 6.2 23.8
Spain∗ 73 9.8 0.8 2.2 12.1 2.0 1.4 2.3 8.6 30.8
Sweden∗ 50 12.7 0.4 2.2 15.6 1.8 1.8 2.7 11.6 26.0
Switzerland∗100 16.6 1.0 1.5 6.9 1.2 0.5 1.6 6.6 19.9
United
States∗
4.834 13.9 0.03 1.8 7.0 1.6 1.8 3.2 6.6 39.3
Total 7.176 12.9 −0.1 1.9 8.0 1.7 2.0 3.2 7.3 37.1
†: AE 6,442 13.0 0.04 1.6 7.2 1.5 1.6 2.9 6.7 38.2
∗: EM 734 12.6 −1.1 4.6 14.7 3.9 5.7 6.4 12.6 27.4
Jurisdictional classification based on IMF (2017)
AE: advanced economies, EM: emerging markets
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Table 2 shows that banks of the United States are dominating the sample given
that 4.834 of 7.176 banks are from the US. For 13 jurisdictions the WACC is on
average below the money market rate. Additionally, we see that in some cases
like the US, Japan, France, and Germany the WACC is very close to the money
market rate. Belgium shows an unusual high value of WACC Spread. This value is
caused by the Belgian bank Dexia which received state aid during the financial
crises (see European Commission, 2010) and is, therefore, plausible.
Table 3: Data sample: Averages by jurisdictions (2003 to 2016).
Year N CR Cost of capital Afree MRP g
WACC Spread WACC d A short long
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
2003 345 11.4 0.5 2.0 6.8 1.8 1.5 4.1 7.2 35.2
2004 466 12.1 −0.2 2.1 7.9 1.5 2.3 4.0 7.1 34.8
2005 514 12.1 −1.7 2.3 8.6 1.9 3.9 4.2 7.1 38.6
2006 554 12.3 −1.9 2.8 8.7 2.6 4.7 4.3 7.3 38.3
2007 573 12.3 −1.9 2.7 8.5 2.9 4.6 4.0 7.2 38.5
2008 597 12.1 −0.2 2.1 6.8 2.5 2.2 2.7 7.3 37.9
2009 576 12.5 1.2 1.9 9.1 1.9 0.7 3.6 7.3 37.7
2010 599 13.3 0.8 1.7 8.0 1.5 0.9 3.3 7.4 37.5
2011 607 13.9 0.3 1.5 7.4 1.3 1.2 2.3 7.4 37.3
2012 587 14.0 0.5 1.4 7.3 1.1 0.9 2.0 7.5 36.8
2013 511 13.7 0.5 1.6 8.3 1.1 1.0 3.0 7.5 36.8
2014 437 14.0 0.5 1.7 7.7 1.1 1.2 2.7 7.4 36.3
2015 406 13.4 0.3 1.7 7.8 1.2 1.4 2.7 7.5 35.8
2016 404 13.5 0.5 1.9 9.1 1.0 1.5 2.7 7.4 35.7
Total 7,176 12.9 −0.1 1.9 8.0 1.7 2.0 3.2 7.3 37.1
Basel II 3,879 12.4 −0.5 2.2 8.2 2.1 2.7 3.7 7.3 37.7
Basel III 2,952 13.8 0.4 1.6 7.9 1.1 1.2 2.5 7.4 36.5
Basel II: 2004 to 2010; Basel III: 2011 to 2016
Regarding the calculated market risk premiums, Italy andMalaysia show unusual
low values resulting from low performance of the included stock market indexes
compared to the yield on sovereign bonds in the observed period of 1990 to
2016. For the other countries included, we observe a range from 3% to 9%
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which is in general consistent with the literature (Fernandez, 2017). Moreover,
we distinguish between advanced economies (AE) and emerging markets (EM)
based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2017). The capital ratio for both
groups is on a similar level while the cost of capital differs showing negative
WACC Spread for emerging markets and a average value of around 0 for advanced
economies. It is notable that the sample for emerging markets is much smaller
(734 observations) compared to the sample for advanced economies (6.442
observations). Therefore, part of our analysis is focused on a pooled sample.
Table 3 shows the time perspective: The WACC and its main component,
the cost of debt A, follow the development of the money market rate. It raises
until 2007 with strong reduction afterwards caused by lower interest rate levels
during 2008 to 2012. The relaxation after 2012 results in minor raises, only.
On the other site, the cost of equity d is more volatile and does not follow
any specific trend. When aggregating the years for Basel II (2004 to 2010)
and Basel III (2011 to 2016), we see that on average the capital ratios were
increased from 12.4% to 13.8% indicating the development of higher capital
endowment. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression
analysis are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on variables used in Table 5.
Statistic N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.
ΔWACC Spread 6,499 0.053 −0.046 1.264 −15.771 16.880
Δ CR 6,499 0.033 0.063 2.442 −25.555 38.746
Δ CR · 2 6,499 0.017 0 1.850 −25.555 38.746
Δ CR · 3 6,499 0.092 0 1.842 18 39
Δ Size 6,499 0.074 0.056 0.139 −0.569 1.694
Δ Deposit ratio 6,499 0.326 0.239 4.060 −26.806 25.941
Δ RoA 6,499 −0.058 −0.012 1.031 −18.815 15.365













Table 5: Dependency between the year-over-year difference of WACC as spread above the money market rate and the Tier 1 capital ratio.
ΔWACC Spread
OLS FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Δ CR 0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Δ CR · 2 0.034∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.082∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.005) (0.044)
Δ CR · 3 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.039)
Δ Size −0.134 −0.428∗∗∗ −0.137 −0.433∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.153) (0.146) (0.152)
Δ Deposit ratio 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Δ RoA −0.157∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.157∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Δ Tax rate −0.268∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.156∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018)
Constant 0.052∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
AE included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
EM included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 6,499 6,499 6,499 6,499 6,499 6,499 6,499 6,499 5,845 654
R2 0.003 0.138 0.440 0.461 0.003 0.138 0.440 0.461 0.6844 0.3192
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.138 0.374 0.397 0.003 0.137 0.374 0.397 0.6476 0.2062
F Statistic 22.056∗∗∗ 208.364∗∗∗ 43.332∗∗∗ 54.081∗∗∗ 11.304∗∗∗ 173.647∗∗∗ 21.977∗∗∗ 45.180∗∗∗ 13.163∗∗∗ 2.930∗
Notes: OLS: Ordinary Least Squares Regression, FE: Fixed Effects Panel Regression, AE: Advanced Economies, EM: Emerging Markets
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parenthesis (Arellano, 1987), constant term for fixed effects models is
omitted due to introduction of bank and time specific effects.
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5 Results
Table 5 shows the results of the specifications given in Equation 7 in model (1)
(without control variables) and (2) (with control variables). Furthermore, the
fixed-effect estimations are model (3) (without control variables) and model
(4) (with control variables). Please note that no constant term is reported as it
is replaced by bank and time specific effects (see Equation 8). The extended
models as specified in Equation 10 and 11 including framework related dummy
variables are shown without and with control variables in models (5) and (6),
respectively (7) and (8). The models (1) to (8) as specified in Table 5 show
a significant, positive coefficient for the parameter Δ CR in a range of 0.028
to 0.035. This means that in general an increase in the change of the Tier 1
ratio of 100 basis points (BP) would be associated to a change in the increase
of WACC Spread of 2.8 BP to 3.5 BP. All models are significant based on the
F-statistics to a significance level of 1%. Using the difference of the Tier 1
ratio Δ CR only as it is done in models (1) and (5), we still estimate significant
coefficients, however, the resulted '2 is close to zero showing that the sole
change in capital endowment cannot explain a high amount of variability in the
changes of the cost of capital. Using the method of variance inflation factors,
we cannot identify any noticeable impact of multicollinearity.
Using the Breusch-Godfrey test, we test positive to serial correlation. As
we test also positive on heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test, we
use standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using
Arellano (1987) estimators. Using the Lagrange Multiplier Tests, the fixed
effects used in the models (3), (4), (7), and (8) are significant when applied
jointly using the specification according to Honda (1985).
The relationship could be shown to be robust by using different model
specifications as well as estimation methods. Therefore, it answers our question
showing that there is a positive relationship between the capital ratio and the cost
of capital. The estimated positive coefficient is in line with the results achieved
by the mentioned country specific works estimating the relationship between
cost of capital and capital ratios indirectly using regressions on CAPM equity V
(Junge and Kugler, 2013; Kashyap et al, 2010), using different specifications
(Miles et al, 2013) as well as using an analytical approach (Firestone et al, 2017).
Nevertheless, our results are contradictory to the results of Toader (2015) showing
negative coefficients in estimating the relationship between the logarithmic
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values of the WACC and Tier 1 capital ratios using a simple OLS. However,
the definition of the WACC used by Toader (2015) differs in mapping external
ratings of banks to CDS spread when estimating the cost of debt. Due to data
availability as well as to include potential effects of funding advantages using
deposits, we use an accounting based approach for our calculation.
Using the expanded specifications (5) to (8) the regression coefficient for
' · 2 (Tier 1 ratio for observations from 2004 to 2010 referring to the
“Pre-Basel III-Period”) is significant to a level of 1% while for ' · 3 (Tier 1
ratio for observations from 2011 to 2016 referring to the “Basel III-Period”)
the significance level is lower. The values of the coefficients for the “Basel
III-Period” are lower than for the “Pre-Basel III-Period” for every specification
showing a reduced sensitivity after the endorsement of Basel III. This implies
that the same rise in the capital endowment (measured in a rise of Tier 1
ratio) would result in a lower rise in the cost of capital compared to the
old regulatory regime. One could argue that there might be reverse causality
between capital ratios and cost of capital given that bank managers might adjust
their capital ratios due to minimizing cost of capital (following the trade-off
theory by Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). Though, this argumentation is only
partially correct as changes in the cost of capital will be considered when
setting the target management capital ratio above the minimum requirement.
We see the adjustment to the capital ratio as mainly exogenous given the high
impact of capital regulation.
Compared to Basel II, the Basel III framework increases the minimum
required Tier 1 ratio from 4% to 8.5%. This includes the capital conservation
buffer of 2.5%. For simplification reasons we do not consider other capital
buffer requirements. If we assume a constant distance to the minimum ratio
and linearity, we would calculate the following change in WACC Spread using a
sensitivity of about 3 BP deviated from specification (2) and (4):
3 % · (8.5 − 4.0) = 13.5 % (12)
Therefore, we calculate an impact of 13.5 BP in raising WACC Spread due to
the rise of Tier 1 for our sample. Considering that the average WACC in our
sample is 1.6%, the calculated impact can be viewed as quite low. As Basel
III also includes a revision of the definition of overall RWA as well as of
the Tier 1 capital components (which can be assessed as stricter), the overall
impact might be underestimated. If we split our sample in banks from advanced
economies as seen in specification (9), respectively emerging markets as seen in
The Effects of the Regulatory Capital Requirements of Basel III 17
specification (10), we still estimate positive coefficients. Using the subsample for
advanced economies, the coefficient is significant for' · 2 as well as' · 3.
However, the coefficient ' · 3 is larger implying a higher sensitivity after the
endorsement of Basel III. In the smaller subsample for emerging markets, the
coefficient for ' · 2 is higher compared to the one for ' · 3 (the latter not
significant any more). The results show that the higher coefficients for ' · 2
in the specification (5) to (8) are mainly driven by the emerging markets given
the higher sensitivity in the pre Basel III period.
6 Conclusions
The BCBS identified high leverage in the banking sector as one of the main
sources for the financial crisis beginning in 2007. As a response, the reg-
ulatory capital requirements were raised by the endorsement of the new
regulatory framework “Basel III”. In the economic literature, several stud-
ies analyze the impact of the raised capital requirements. We contributed to
this discussion by using an international sample representing the majority of
the BCBS member countries.
Regarding the question of which dependency exists in general between capital
ratios of banks and the cost of capital, we identified a positive relationship
between capital ratios and the cost of capital. The relationship is robust as
different model specification and estimation methods show.
Regarding the question, whether there is any change to the observed relation-
ship due to the Basel III framework, we could show that globally the sensitivity
of the cost of capital on the capital ratios was reduced after the endorsement
of Basel III. This implies that the same rise in capital would result in a lower
rise in the cost of capital than in the previous regulatory regime reducing the
overall effect of higher capital requirements. Nevertheless, the effect is mostly
connected to emerging markets. Only when incorporating advanced economies,
we estimate a raise in the sensitivity of the cost of capital to capital ratios.
To continue to analyze this implication, future research could focus on the
finalization of the Basel III framework (BCBS, 2017a) which might not have a
significant impact on the banking sector as a whole but nonetheless on some
individual banks as stated in BCBS (2017b).
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